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In the present paper, I examined the processes of corporate bankruptcy proceedings of
the listed companies on the Korea Stock Exchange. I collected a comprehensive list of all
listed companies that went bankrupt since 1990. The main findings are as follows: first,
the economic crisis resulted in a number of large firms going bankrupt; second, the
duration varies substantially across the firms that survived; and finally, a set of organi-
zational characteristics such as sales, assets, firm age at the time of bankruptcy, and,
most importantly, when a firm filed for bankruptcy influenced the duration of bank-
ruptcy proceedings. These findings illustrate the impacts of key organizational factors
and institutional environments on the organizational processes of post-bankruptcy pro-
ceedings toward going back to business.
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CORPORATE BANKRUPTCY PROCEEDINGS AS ORGANIZATIONAL
PROCESSES  
Once a firm goes bankrupt, three things are possible: (1) returning to pre-
vious conditions in terms of organization, products, and governance struc-
ture; (2) maintaining part of previous conditions with changes in the others
(e.g., keeping organization with a new ownership); and (3) liquidating a
firm either as a whole or as separate parts. This paper examines the
sequence and speed of processes which decide the fate of bankrupt firms.
After the 1997 International Monetary Fund (hereafter IMF) crisis, sudden
increases in corporate bankruptcies have made insolvency part of corporate
environments, and this study begins with the premise that quick, efficient
and equitable administration of bankruptcy processes has become a crucial
institutional setting for a healthy economy. 
Organizational studies tend to focus on organizational success, while
studies based on population ecology analyze organizational failures.
However, these ecological studies are likely to focus on the population level
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of organizations and, more importantly, the temporal scope of such studies
covers from founding to break-up of organizations. What is lacking is more
micro-level analysis of the processes of organizational failures within a
shorter time span. It is certainly a crucial theoretical as well as empirical
decision that sets a starting time-point of organizational failure: when does
a failing organization start to fail? I argue that, instead of looking at the
founding and disbanding of an organization, examining bankruptcy pro-
ceedings provide an alternative way of understanding failures as continu-
ous processes, and not as static events. The period between corporate bank-
ruptcies and final outcomes presents an important opportunity to under-
stand the characteristics of sociological processes of organizational failures,
where key participants such as stock holders, employees, and diverse credi-
tors with often contradictory interests negotiate decisions at every step of
the bankruptcy proceedings. 
Theoretically interesting aspects of bankruptcy proceedings lie in the fact
that they are organizational “processes” whose various dimensions affect
the interests of their participants. Temporal length and sequences of such
processes are part of crucial battlegrounds for key actors: how fast are the
processes going and what courses or steps are they taking? These are not
just matters of theoretical debates, but issues that will decide who wins and
who loses in the end. Thus, corporate bankruptcy proceedings will provide
an alternative way of theorizing process-based aspects of organizational life
which static organizational studies have relatively neglected. 
As the first step of analyzing corporate bankruptcies, this paper seeks to
examine the length and sequence of Korean bankrupt firms during the time
of the economic crisis of 1997. This paper will examine how the economic
crisis and subsequent legal reforms of bankruptcy proceedings affected the
processes of corporate bankruptcies. Theoretically, this paper will rely on an
institutionalist idea that institutional changes influence organizational
processes through influencing the interests of relevant actors (Powell and
DiMaggio, 1991; Fligstein, 2001; Fligstein and Stone, 2002; Oliver, 1991). In
particular, I will examine how the duration of bankruptcy proceedings
changes, along with changes in legal environments of corporate bankruptcy
proceedings in terms of legislative revisions in bankruptcy law since the
economic crisis. Each legal reform in 1998, 1999, and 2001, resulting from
the pressures of the IMF, the World Bank and the government, sought to
enhance the efficiency of corporate bankruptcy procedures, especially the
pace of the proceedings by streamlining the procedures. I will examine the
effects of each legal reform by analyzing changes in the duration of bank-
ruptcy proceedings along with the year in which each bankruptcy case took
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place. I will also study the effects of organizational environments by found-
ing year of a bankrupt firm. 
In addition to environmental factors, organizational resources can influ-
ence bankruptcy proceedings by providing different costs and benefits of a
bankrupt firm as a going concern to stake holders. For this, I will examine
organizational characteristics of a bankruptcy firm such as employee size,
capital, sales, profits, assets, and debts when a firm went bankrupt. I will
also analyze the effects of corporate governance in terms of its degree of
hierarchical control. The degree of hierarchical control of a firm can affect
the way creditors and other stake holders evaluate the possibility of normal-
izing the firm. I will examine corporate governance by the percentage of
shares that a principal shareholder controls. 
Finally, the choices within bankruptcy proceedings can affect overall out-
comes. A key decision in the proceedings is to choose between composition
and reorganization, two main courses. Since each course represents different
advantages and disadvantages to different types of participants, the choice
between them can affect the final outcome. Thus, I will analyze the effect of
such decisions on bankruptcy duration. 
In short, I will examine how organizational, environmental, and proce-
dural factors shape bankruptcy proceedings as organizational processes in
which participants with conflicting interests negotiate collective consensus. 
PREVIOUS STUDIES ON CORPORATE BANKRUPTCIES 
In organizational studies, organizational failure has been overshadowed
by its counterpart, organizational success. From classical studies to contin-
gency theory, transaction cost approach, resource dependence theory, and
the institutional approach, the conditions to achieve organizational goals,
although the definition varies among theoretical positions, have been the
main story. Then, what happens to organizations that fail? 
Organizational Studies and Organizational Failures 
For most studies, failing organizations are significant only to highlight
their differences from successful organizations and provide evidence for the
importance of the winner ’s qualities that each perspective proposes.
Population ecology is exceptional in examining an extreme version of orga-
nizational failures, its death (Hannan and Freeman, 1989). It seeks to explain
organizational mortality and its collective manifestation at an organizational
population level. However, such an approach to organizational failures is
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tuned to a collective level at the expense of understanding the failing
processes of an individual organization. Organizational failures are narrow-
ly defined by focusing on their death, an extreme mode. It oversimplifies
diverse courses and modes of organizational failure. Ecological studies pro-
vide a corpse of organizational death, and they suggest probable causes of
death. What is not presented is a more immediate process of how an organi-
zation died. 
Examining the processes after a firm goes bankrupt offers a way in which
we can understand immediate processes of organizational failure.
Organizational failure is a multi-dimensional, frequently long, and sociolog-
ical process participated in by multiple actors. Every organization that goes
bankrupt does not die. It faces multiple courses and multiple outcomes. By
linking individual and ecological conditions of an organization with the
processes and outcomes of bankruptcy proceedings, we are able to under-
stand failing processes as organizational ones. Additionally, it is possible to
examine the impacts of institutional factors such as changes in legislation,
government policies, the overall number of corporate bankruptcies as a
whole, and the economic and institutional pressures of globalization. 
Studies on Corporate Bankruptcies 
Studies on corporate bankruptcies in Korea have focused on the Korean
bankruptcy legislation and their revisions. They examine either procedures
of bankruptcy proceedings in each legislation, or basic statistics of bank-
ruptcies (Oh, 1997, 2002, 2003; Ministry of Court Administration, 1996;
Court Library, 2000; Nam and Oh, 2000). In addition to a legal approach,
economists analyze costs in bankruptcy administration or strategies of
financial institutions for corporate bankruptcies (Ku, 1998). Managerial sci-
entists of corporate bankruptcies mainly deal with proposing a firm-level
model to predict a bankruptcy (Ahn et. al., 2001; Park et. al., 2003). These
previous studies, however, ignore organizational processes of corporate
bankruptcies in which different courses and durations take place, which can
affect a final outcome. 
Similar to domestic studies, Anglo-American scholars deal with legal and
economic costs of corporate bankruptcies. There are two exceptions. First,
LoPucki and Whitford (1993) examine the processes of 43 bankrupt publicly
held firms reporting at least $100 million in assets at filing, in which a reor-
ganization plan was confirmed before March, 1988. It is exceptional in that
they looked at the processes after filing bankruptcy and sought to examine
different outcomes. They found that a substantial number of firms ended up
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filing for bankruptcy after completing reorganization. Also, a large number
of companies relied on liquidation to a varying degree as well as reorganiza-
tion. This suggests that the organizational processes of the American corpo-
rate bankruptcies are not separated among different courses and are experi-
encing a high rate of failure in terms of refiling for bankruptcy. 
Another exception is Halliday and Carruthers (2003). As an extension of
their previous study on bankruptcy legislation reforms in Britain and the
U.S. (Carruthers and Halliday, 1998), they compare legislative processes in
which Indonesia, Korea, and China enacted or revised bankruptcy laws
after each society experienced a financial crisis or pressures for rationalizing
financial systems to join economic globalization. In a comparative frame-
work, they examined how globalization demanding rational administration
of corporate bankruptcy shaped a new or revised bankruptcy system by
influencing interactions among politicians, corporations, financial institu-
tions, professionals (lawyers, accountants, and economists), and workers. 
To sum up, previous studies on corporate bankruptcies with an exception
of LoPucki and Whitford (1993) lack attention to bankruptcy proceedings as
organizational processes. I argue that a careful analysis of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings in terms of courses or steps, duration of each step, and final out-
come, is essential to understand the procedures and outcomes as organiza-
tional processes, and to develop more efficient, rational, and equitable bank-
ruptcy administration. Such bankruptcy administration improves an exit
system of failed firms, which is crucial for a healthy economy. The present
paper is the first step in this direction by collecting and analyzing patterns
in the courses and duration in bankruptcy proceedings of the listed compa-
nies in the Korean Stock Exchange that filed for bankruptcy. In the next sec-
tion, I will briefly review trends in corporate bankruptcies and their charac-
teristics in Korea during the 1990s. 
CORPORATE BANKRUPTCIES AND THE LEGAL REFORMS AS
INSTITUTIONAL RESPONSES FOR EFFICIENCY 
The aftermath of the economic crisis of 1997 made corporate bankruptcies
crucial socially as well as economically. The sudden surge of small and large
firms going bankrupt sent a shockwave throughout the entire economy by
way of a large number of suppliers and banks that provided loans to these
companies. The employees of the bankrupt firms faced a massive scale of
unemployment with insufficient provisions of unemployment insurance
benefits. 
Economic and social effects of the crisis have not subsided quickly. The
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institutional responses to the crisis turned out to aggravate the situation.
The IMF demanded increasing interest rates as a way to stabilize a mone-
tary market, which decreased asset values of firms and worsened their
financial difficulties. Consequently, the number of corporate bankruptcies
increased dramatically in the first quarter of 1998. The following figure
shows that both bankrupt firms and the amount of default loans slightly
increased in 2003 after a brief stabilization during the second part of 2002. 
Corporate bankruptcies are part of a capitalist economy and have
occurred in any period of the Korean economy. However, what was unique
in the late 1990s was a sudden increase in the number of bankruptcies and
the fact that large firms, including the subsidiaries of the Korean conglomer-
ates, were included. The following table shows increasing bankruptcies of
the Korean conglomerates during the economic crisis. 
The table indicates that between 1996 and 1997, the bankruptcy cases of
large firms increased from 7 to 58. For medium size companies, the number
increased from 5,150 to 8,160. Without extending the redemption period of
loans by banks fearing their own crisis, more large firms would have gone
bankrupt. 
Bankruptcy proceedings, however, do not have a pre-determined out-
come. Post-bankruptcy proceedings have multiple courses and outcomes
with varying paces. The bankruptcy law states the conditions for which
course and which outcome, but actual events result from a combination of
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TABLE 1. CORPORATE BANKRUPTCIES BETWEEN 1996 AND 1999.
Period Large Firm Small and Medium Size Firm Non-public Corporation Total
1996 7 5150 6342 11589
1997 58 8160 8942 17168
November 17 697 755 1469
December 19 1540 1638 3197
1998 39 10497 12292 22828
January-March 16 4275 5158 949
April-June 8 2847 3502 6357
July-September 8 2031 2182 4221
October-December 7 1344 1450 2801
1999 7 2486 2578 5071
January-March 2 925 1005 1932
April-June 3 801 858 1662
July-September 2 760 715 1477
Note: The criterion for a large firm is one with more than 300 full-time employees (Source: Nam and
Oh, 2000:17) 
diverse factors including size of debts, characteristics of a firm such as its
size of assets and employees, and complexity of a debt relation. To under-
stand the processes as a whole, it is important to understand legally defined
courses of the proceedings. 
First, what is bankruptcy? It means that a person or an organization is not
able to pay loans or debts on time due to insufficient funds.1 However,
bankruptcy does not automatically mean dissolution of a firm. The law
specifies three types of outcomes for bankrupt firms: composition; reorgani-
zation; and liquidation. First, composition is a process in which creditors
agree to reschedule payment of debts to avoid the dissolution of a bankrupt
firm. Reorganization refers to a process in which creditors, stock owners
and other interested parties make and carry out a plan to normalize a firm.
Liquidation refers to a process in which creditors sell all the assets of a
bankrupt firm to pay off its debts. What is important is that an application
for either one of the bankruptcy courses is not automatically granted, but
should be approved by a bankruptcy court. It is the most critical part of the
court’s decision to approve or reject each application. 
The following figure illustrates procedures after filing for bankruptcy: 
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1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Fig. 1. Trends in Corporate Bankruptcies(Source: Korea Bank, annual statistics for corporate bank-
ruptcies)
1 For a general description of a corporate bankruptcy system, see Choi and Ji (1998), Nam
and Oh (2000), Kang (2001), Seoul Branch Court (2002), Kong (1995), and bankruptcy-related
legislations.
It is important to note that each bankruptcy case does not follow the
above direction of events in a pre-determined way. For example, it is possi-
ble to start from either composition or reorganization; it is also possible to
start from composition and fail and then to start reorganization procedures.
However, no case can be both composition and reorganization simultane-
ously. Also, cancellation is possible anywhere between the steps, which can
lead to other types of procedures or simply to liquidation and dissolution.
Most importantly, the order of events and duration for each event result
from a combination of factors, including the characteristics of a bankrupt
firm, size of debts, and complexity of debt relation. 
Composition and reorganization are similar in that they provide a way to
normalize a bankrupt firm. The key difference is that the managers of a
bankrupt firm stay in composition, while custodians appointed by the court
replace the managers in reorganization. Naturally, the CEO of a bankrupt
firm favors composition to maintain his or her control over the firm.
However, it was reported that composition processes were likely to drag
due to the moral hazard problems of the CEO. Consequently, the revisions
of the bankruptcy law since 1997 aim to specify conditions to choose com-
position and to restrict composition for relatively small size companies with
small and simple creditor relationships. The subsequent revisions of the
bankruptcy law, particularly the 1998 revision from the demands of the
Ministry of Finance and Economy, stated that courts are advised to examine
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Fig. 2. Flow of Organizational Processes of Corporate Bankruptcy Proceedings.
the size of assets, debts, and the degree of complexity of credit relations
(Choi and Ji 1998). In other words, the revisions aim to discourage bank-
ruptcy courts from allowing a reorganization course for large companies
with huge amounts of complicated credit relations, which tend to drag over-
all processes and to erode entire assets on its way to dissolution. 
To summarize the overall characteristics of the Korean bankruptcy law
after a number of revisions is that it has been approaching the American
system in which overall efficiency of bankruptcy proceedings, such as pro-
cedural duration, is emphasized over equitable distribution of assets among
stake holders. Also, it has followed the American system in which corporate
executives tend to receive a second chance to manage a bankrupt firm in its
effort for normalization. 
The following table, however, shows that reorganization cases were more
than those of composition and liquidation before 1997, but the numbers
were reversed after 1997. 
It suggests that the managers of bankrupt firms were likely to favor com-
position over reorganization, and that a large number of firms that entered
composition or reorganization processes ended up in liquidation. These
trends are clearer in the following table. 
If we divide bankruptcy cases between the 1980s and 1990s, for the 1980s,
174 cases out of 266 (65.4%) that applied for reorganization were approved.
Forty-nine cases out of 105 (46.7%) that entered reorganization procedures
successfully finished them, while 49 cases (46.7%) had their procedures can-
celled and liquidated. In the 1990s, 433 cases out of 769 (56.3%) that applied
for reorganization were approved. One hundred and forty-four cases out of
342 (42.1%) that entered the processes successfully completed them, while
129 cases (37.7%) failed and were liquidated. 
The differences between the 1980s and 1990s indicate that bankruptcy
courts reduced the approval rate of a reorganization application. Public
scandals on the moral hazard of the managers of a few firms led to pressure
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TABLE 2. CORPORATE BANKRUPTCIES AND TYPES OF PROCEEDINGS IN 1995-1999.
Types 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Reorganization 79 52 132 148 37
Composition 13 9 322 728 140
Liquidation 12 18 38 467 733
Total 104 79 492 407 910
Source: Nam and Oh, 2000: 18
on the courts to increase the criteria for granting reorganization. However,
at the same time, the failure rate of reorganization processes in the 1990s
was still close to 40%, suggesting that procedural efficiency did not improve
substantially. 
In the above table, in terms of procedural efficiency, the number of unset-
tled cases is as serious as a failure rate. The number of unsettled cases con-
tinued to increase: there were 84 cases in 1983 and 187 in 1999. Unsettled
cases indicate that the proceedings took longer, and a longer duration often
results in loss of assets and of a declining chance for a firm’s survival. The
following table shows the duration of each step of reorganization proce-
dures for bankrupt firms from 1991 to 1994. 
Considering that the period is prior to the economic crisis, the procedures
are relatively long. In particular, it took ten months on average from an
application to a court’s approval. It took 9 years on average from the start of
reorganization to completion, compared to 6 years from the start to cancella-
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TABLE 3. STATISTICS FOR REORGANIZATION PROCESSES
83 85 20 57 65 53 39 12 2 12 6 6 . 116 32 84
84 77 25 82 542 53 35 9 9 29 16 12 1 112 24 88
95 64 24 88 40 55 27 13 15 13 2 10 1 113 9 104
86 35 9 104 26 24 8 10 6 6 1 5 . 117 11 106
87 41 11 106 30 23 18 1 4 20 9 9 2 122 18 104
88 44 18 104 26 24 18 3 3 10 6 4 . 132 20 112
89 47 20 112 27 33 29 1 3 15 9 3 3 140 14 126
90 29 14 126 15 21 17 4 . 21 10 4 7 130 8 122
91 72 8 122 64 46 26 10 10 20 8 3 9 154 26 128
92 115 26 128 89 89 44 35 10 17 10 3 4 181 26 155
93 71 26 155 45 44 25 19 . 33 11 22 . 174 27 147
94 95 27 147 68 68 48 18 2 14 5 8 1 208 27 181
95 106 27 151 79 76 32 29 15 28 5 23 . 185 30 155
96 82 30 155 52 55 29 17 9 30 12 16 2 181 27 154
97 159 27 154 132 87 43 24 20 32 11 13 8 237 72 165
98 220 72 165 148 123 92 25 17 88 38 23 27 255 86 169
99 123 86 169 37 104 77 13 14 59 34 14 11 206 19 187
total 995 989 607 243 139 447 193 178 76



































tion. Bankruptcy experts repeatedly point out that the duration of the pro-
ceedings alone affects the amount of remaining financial values of bankrupt
firms: the values often are eroded rapidly along with a possibility of getting
back to business as usual. 
Why does it often take so long? The decisions during the proceedings are
essentially collective and social in that all those who were involved; short
and long term creditors, shareholders, managers, employees and others,
have to form a majority consensus, if not a perfect consensus. It can be easi-
ly imagined that each type of actor has different ideas of rational decisions
and outcomes, which are likely to produce a zero-sum game situation
among them. It is the responsibility of the judges to bring out a consensus as
rationally, equitably, and quickly as possible, but the business side of bank-
ruptcy firms is notoriously complex for judges who lack experience and
knowledge of such matters. 
The special report on corporate bankruptcies from the National Assembly
also stated that the length of the bankruptcy proceedings is as serious as the
number of corporate bankruptcies and their default loans. The report
showed that the reckless management of owners and the problems of super-
vising organizations led to long processes and subsequent decreases in cor-
porate assets. It indicates that bankruptcy proceedings are not homoge-
neous processes that are pre-determined by legal criteria. Actual outcomes
vary with the characteristics of bankrupt firms, their debts, and their credi-
tor relationships, given that bankruptcies are a “normal” part of a capitalist
economy. It also suggests that rational administration of bankruptcy pro-
ceedings is as crucial as preventing corporate bankruptcies. In short, the
duration of corporate bankruptcy proceedings are crucial in understanding
the outcomes of bankruptcy as organizational processes with participants
pursuing conflicting interests. 
RESCUING BUSINESS 59
TABLE 4. TIME FOR EACH STEP IN REORGANIZATION PROCESSES
Step
No. average minimum maximum 
of Firm duration duration duration
from application to asset freeze 19 46.7days 1week 9months
from application to approval 22 10.1months 4months 4years
from application to rejection 16 6.1months 1month 30months
from approval to completion 6 9.1years 3years 11.8years
(normalization)
from approval to cancellation 9 5.6years 1month 14years
(Source: Kong, 1995:87-89.) 
DATA
This paper examines processes after corporations listed on the Korean
Stock Exchange filed for bankruptcy from 1990 to 2004. I collected the data
of all bankrupt listed companies from 1990 to 2002 to examine changes in
bankruptcy processes before and after the economic crisis of 1997. However,
as it will be shown later, bankruptcies of the listed companies were rare
before the economic crisis. 
The main data source is the Korea Information Service (hereafter, KIS),
which provides a comprehensive database of all listed companies and their
annual financial data and crucial events such as bankruptcies. I started with
the list of bankrupt firms from this database. To see if there were additional
corporate bankruptcies in addition to those identified by the KIS, I also
examined the list of bankrupt companies from the data of the Korean Stock
Exchange and business daily newspapers for the entire period. 
The search resulted in 155 corporate bankruptcy cases between 1990 and
2002. Once I identified bankrupt listed companies, I relied on several
sources to find relevant data for these companies. Since the main focus of
this paper is the duration of each step of bankruptcy proceedings, it was
crucial to identify not only the timing of bankruptcy, but the timing of each
event or step in the ensuing bankruptcy proceedings. It is well known that
such data are hard to collect since no databases are collected by organiza-
tions such as commercial information service providers to governmental
organizations such as courts or the Ministry of Justice. Newspapers often
carry articles on bankruptcies of Chaebol subsidiaries, but they are selective
in terms of the cases. More importantly, they do not provide systematic
information on the timing of key events of bankruptcy proceedings. It is
possible to check the court records of individual bankruptcy cases, but this
requires approval of the judge who presided over the case. 
An alternative source of data is the corporation registry collected by the
Supreme Court. All publicly held corporations, by law, have to provide
basic information including bankruptcy to the corporation registry. Once a
corporation files for bankruptcy, the law requires that the subsequent cours-
es of events and their exact timing are recorded in the registry. Since I
acquired a comprehensive list of all listed companies that filed for bank-
ruptcy for the period, I collected the registries of all the companies.
Consequently, I was able to identify exact timing of key events after bank-
ruptcy for all listed companies since 1990. To verify the accuracy of timing
data, I cross-checked the data with the data of the Financial Supervisory
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Service (Keumyungkamdogwon), the Korea Stock Exchange, the annually
updated databases from commercial databases such as the Annual Report of
the Listed Companies, and business daily newspapers. 
Additional data for the identified companies came from various sources:
first, the Korea Information Service database which presents all financial
data for the period of the previous 3 years before bankruptcy, bankruptcy
year, and 1 year after bankruptcy; second, for verifying data accuracy and
additional data, I examined all the annual reports from the Financial
Supervisory Service to which all publicly held companies provide compre-
hensive data on a regular basis; and finally, business daily newspapers and
their annual reports of the listed companies. In short, the present paper cov-
ers all the 155 listed companies filing for bankruptcy since 1990, what
processes they went through, and for how long. 
In the following, I will present basic analyses of the 155 firms. Next, out
of 155, I selected 71 companies that successfully completed either composi-
tion or reorganization. Why such a selection? Since I am interested in how
long it took for a company to successfully complete bankruptcy proceed-
ings, I chose all the companies that survived through either composition or
reorganization processes. Also, in this paper, I focused on 71 companies that
had already completed entire courses to avoid a right-censoring problem,
which refers to an arbitrary halt of data due to a span of data collection. All
the other companies either dropped out of composition or reorganization
processes into dissolution, or went to dissolution straight out of
bankruptcy.2
ARGUMENT: THE DURATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS FOR
SURVIVORS 
How long did it take for bankrupt firms to complete either composition or
reorganization? The following figure shows that it varies with each case. 
I will examine the impacts of three factors: first, organizational character-
istics of a bankrupt firm; second, the course of bankruptcy proceedings
(composition or reorganization); and finally, organizational and institutional
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2 Selecting companies that survived may result in a selection bias by excluding those firms
that are still in the process. As an anonymous reviewer points out, it is possible that, had
recently bankrupt firms been included in the final data, the periodic variations in bankruptcy
duration might have been different. On the other hand, the pattern of decreasing duration
over the years, I argue, is so clear that the right-censored cases would have shown shorter
duration than the duration of bankrupt firms in previous periods. However, selecting sur-
vived firms is clearly a limitation of this paper. I will address a right censoring issue by apply-
ing an event history analysis in another paper.
environments. 
Organizational Characteristics 
The assumption for these factors is that organizational characteristics of a
bankrupt firm, such as its resources, governance structure, market perfor-
mance, debts, and industry type would influence the way the participants
in the bankruptcy proceedings such as judges, lawyers, creditors, and man-
agers decide their positions and thus the outcome and duration of the pro-
ceedings.3
For resources, I examine employee size, capital, asset, and firm age at the
time of bankruptcy. I argue that organizational resources would provide an
incentive for the participants to survive a firm, and I hypothesize that the
larger the resources a firm has, the shorter is the duration to complete the
processes. Following previous studies, I argue the older a firm is, then the
more resources, organizational or institutional, it has. Thus, I hypothesize
that the older a firm is, the shorter the duration is. 
A large size of a firm’s debts would make it harder to pay off. The size of
debts would also correspond to the degree of complexity of a firm’s debt
structure with a large number of creditors. Thus I argue that the more debts
a firm has, the less incentives its creditors have to survive it, and the harder
it is for them to reach a consensus. Thus, I hypothesize that the size of debts
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Fig. 3. Duration from Bankruptcy to Normalization
3 I examined the effects of these same variables at different points of time (e.g., 3, 2, and 1
year before bankruptcy respectively). The results did not show statistically significant results,
suggesting that the participants of the proceedings consider the characteristics of a bankrupt
firm at its immediacy, not its past, as a useful reference.
would increase the duration of the proceedings. 
For governance structure, I examine principal shareholder percentage as a
proxy measure. Principal shareholder percentage can tell us how centralized
a firm’s ownership is. I argue that centralized control of a firm would facili-
tate negotiations between the owners and their creditors. Thus, I hypothe-
size that the more centralized a firm’s control is, the more easily a consensus
would come about. 
For market performance, I examine total sales and profits. I argue that
better performance, like organizational resources, provides stronger incen-
tives for creditors to make a firm a going concern. Thus I hypothesize that
the better its performance is, the shorter the duration is. 
I examine the effects of industry type (manufacturing as a reference) as a
control variable. 
The Choice over Courses: Composition versus Reorganization 
Although composition and reorganization are both channels of the same
proceedings, they are alternatives to each other, and participants in bank-
ruptcy proceedings would view them as different options. A critical differ-
ence is that managers stay and control their firm in composition, while legal
custodians appointed by the court take over in reorganization. In particular,
legislative reforms have pushed judges to assign large companies with more
complex debt structure to reorganization. Thus, I hypothesize that firms
entering reorganization processes would spend more time in the proceed-
ings than those entering composition. 
Organizational and Institutional Environments 
Organizational and institutional environments shape organizations by
providing key resources and constraints, organizational boundaries, and
cultural blueprints as organizational models. Among these various channels
of environmental influence, I will focus on key insights of both the popula-
tion ecology approach (Hannan and Freeman, 1989) and the institutional
approach (Powell and DiMaggio, 1991). Population ecology argues that
organizational environments shape organizational mortality by availability
of key resources. The institutional approach contends that organizational
actors rely on various institutional elements to justify their claims socially
and culturally; and that institutional frameworks, especially legal ones,
actively shape possible courses of action for participants in organizational
processes, through formal incentives and sanctions. 
In this paper, I examine how both resource and institutional environments
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shape individual organizations not throughout their entire life cycles, but
through organizational processes of bankruptcy proceedings where bank-
rupt firms seek to get a second chance. There are different ways to measure
environments of a bankrupt firm. In the present paper, I examine the period
in which a firm was founded as a proxy measure of its organizational envi-
ronment. A firm’s founding year can capture the aspect of resource environ-
ments which change temporally. The resource environments when a firm
was created would shape the organizational structure of a firm, and it
would influence a firm at a later stage of its development (Stinchcombe,
1964). 
Bankruptcy year as a proxy measure for a firm’s institutional environ-
ment is the key variable. I argue that bankruptcy year provides information
on its institutional environment. First, the number of corporate bankruptcies
varies across years. The listed companies rarely went bankrupt before 1997,
and the number of bankruptcies of large companies surged drastically dur-
ing the crisis. What has clearly changed after the crisis is a general recogni-
tion that large companies can go bankrupt even in normal economic condi-
tions. Thus, after the crisis, there have been increasingly more domestic and
foreign socio-economic and political pressures to improve efficiency of
bankruptcy proceedings and speed up the pace. 
Another dimension of bankruptcy year indicates the effects of legislative
revisions. As I stated earlier, there were a number of substantial revisions
throughout the late 1990s and early 2000s. They all aimed to reduce the
duration of the proceedings. Thus, the timing of bankruptcy year decided
which version of bankruptcy legislation would guide the proceedings. I
argue that legislative revisions in bankruptcy law facilitated “coercive iso-
morphism” in bankruptcy procedures (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983). Such
revisions enforced new guidelines, which influenced strategies of partici-
pants in bankruptcy proceedings for better overall efficiency of the bank-
ruptcy system. I hypothesize that the later a firm filed for bankruptcy, the
shorter the duration is: either from more institutional pressures or from
legal changes to speed up the bankruptcy proceedings. 
ANALYSIS 
Given the impact of the crisis on corporate bankruptcy, it is interesting to
see the annual frequency of the present dataset. The following figure shows
that the listed companies show a trend that is similar to other types of com-
panies in the same period. 
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The figure shows that there was a slight decrease after 1992, a clear jump
in 1997 and 1998, and a quick decline after 1999. This trend suggests that
bankruptcy courts experienced an enormous burden after the crisis.
Considering that the courts had to deal with large companies since 1997, the
timing of bankruptcy of a company would influence its duration of bank-
ruptcy proceedings. 
It has been argued that industries differ in their risk of bankruptcy. The
present data confirms a common assumption: manufacturing companies are
the largest due to their large share in the economy and the acute impact of
the crisis; construction and sales are the next industries that are prone to
experience a shock in economic downturns. 
What are the characteristics of the bankrupt companies? The following
table presents the aspects of the firms. 
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Fig. 4. Annual Number of Bankruptcies of Listed Companies
TABLE 5. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF ALL BANKRUPT FIRMS WHEN BANKRUPT (n=155)
firm employee principal capital sales profits debts
age size shareholder (unit: million (unit: million (unit: million (unit:
(year) percentage won) won) won) million won)
Mean 27.1 356.9 15.8 29118.4 172281.8 -61818.2 336493.3
Median 27.0 294.0 12.3 16579.9 72741.5 -20019.1 113475.5
Standard 
10.8 239.0 10.6 35616.9 351499.3 169304.8 736360.9
Deviation
Minimum 5.0 6.0 1.4 964.0 4132.2 -1709593.0 5785.9
Since these are the listed companies, their age and overall size in multiple
dimensions tend to be larger than the average Korean companies. The fact
that the Chaebol subsidiaries did go bankrupt after 1997 is likely to increase
the firm size. What is notable in the table is “principal shareholder percent-
age.” It shows the percentage of shares of a top shareholder in total shares.
Here the median and mean percentages are a little more than 10%, whereas
the maximum is 70%. It shows that the present dataset includes companies
with different types of corporate governance, reflecting varying sizes in
other dimensions. 
The following table focuses on the pace at which the companies worsened
after the crisis in multiple dimensions. 
For example, in the case of employee change rate, it measures this pace by
the following method: employee change rate = ((employee size when bank-
rupt — employee size 3 years before bankruptcy)/employee size 3 years
before bankruptcy) * 100 
In other words, the larger a negative number is for this rate, the faster or
the more a company worsened during a time span of 3 years before bank-
ruptcy. The largest degree of decline lies in profits, employee size, and prin-
cipal shareholder percentage in a decreasing order. It suggests a combina-
tion of two possible scenarios: a failing process hits such aspects of a firm as
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TABLE 6. HOW FAST ALL FIRMS WORSENED - PERIOD UP TO BANKRUPTCY (change rate,
n=155)
employee asset capital sales profits debts
principal share
holder percentage
Mean -30.1 19.5 41.7 7.0 -1685.2 77.4 -14.0
Median -33.7 -3.9 31.3 -5.6 -912.2 47.1 -17.1
Standard Deviation 35.0 83.7 65.2 100.2 15949.2 122.7 47.2
Minimum -93.2 -79.6 -93.5 -85.7 -77474.9 -72.6 -95.1
TABLE 7. BASIC CHARACTERISTICS OF BANKRUPT FIRMS THAT SURVIVED (n=71)
firm age employee principal capital sales (unit: profits debts
(year) size shareholder (unit: million won) (unit: (unit: 
percentage million won) million won) million won)
Mean 28.0 384.2 15.1 26721.9 129435.1 -51823.6 243509.3
Median 28.0 315.0 12.3 14739.3 85126.4 -28078.7 150458.3
Standard 
8.4 240.4 9.0 33528.4 139185.0 116397.3 291162.4
Deviation
Minimum 5.0 17.0 2.0 1843.8 8100.5 -472063.4 18283.1
profits first; or, the managers of a failing firm react to crisis by reducing
employee size and principal shareholder percentage. Why would they
reduce principal shareholder percentage? It can be argued that they sought
to reduce their future loss by reducing their shares. 
How would all the bankrupt firms be compared with those that success-
fully completed the processes and went back to business? The following
two tables present the same summaries for the 71 survivors. 
The two tables suggest that the surviving companies are not clearly differ-
ent from other bankrupt companies that eventually failed in terms of basic
financial characteristics at the time of filing for bankruptcy.4
It was shown above that a substantial variation exists for the duration of
bankruptcy proceedings. Why did a firm complete the proceedings relative-
ly quickly, for example, within a year, while others spent a couple of years?
The following is the result of an OLS analysis based on the arguments I pre-
sented above. 
Model 1 examines the effects of organizational characteristics of a bank-
rupt firm. Among financial characteristics of a firm, it is total sales when a
firm went bankrupt that decreases the duration with a statistical signifi-
cance. As suggested above, it can be argued that total sales signify market
performance of a firm. Thus, the more sales a firm produced, the stronger
incentives stake holders in the proceedings would have to normalize a firm
quickly. 
Although they did not produce statistically significant results, resource
variables such as employee, asset, and debt sizes all tend to increase the
duration of the proceedings. From the direction of the relationships, it can
be further argued that such size dimensions refer to the degree of complexi-
ty and difficulties to streamline a firm. It is interesting that principal share-
holder percentage, a measure of centralized governance, seems to increase
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4 Although it was not reported here, an additional analysis comparing two groups, sur-
vivors and losers, did not produce statistically significant differences in terms of the dimen-
sions mentioned here.
TABLE 8. HOW FAST THE FIRMS THAT SURVIVED WORSENED - UP TO BANKRUPTCY (n=71)
employee asset capital sales profits debts
principal share
holder percentage
Mean -24.1 20.9 48.5 14.9 -643.0 78.2 -9.1
Median -25.0 -5.8 45.9 -7.5 -1134.7 35.7 -19.4
Standard Deviation 36.7 92.6 72.7 126.0 20430.1 145.0 52.2
Minimum -88.4 -74.0 -93.3 -72.5 -77474.9 -72.6 -85.5
the duration of the proceedings. Further study is necessary to see if central-
ized control provides leverage to owners and managers in negotiations with
creditors, which makes it harder to change a firm. 
Firm age at the time of bankruptcy shows a positive relationship with the
duration, although it is not statistically significant. The industry type also
does not produce statistically significant results, but the bankrupt firms
from the sales industry seem to recover quickly, as compared with those
from the manufacturing industry. 
Model 2 examines if the course of the proceedings, either composition or
reorganization, affects the duration. The practitioners in the field (Choi and
Ji 1998) suggest that composition takes longer than reorganization because
the managers maintain their control and resist changes demanded by credi-
tors. It is true that the firms in reorganization are run by a legal custodian
appointed by the court. However, such firms are likely to be relatively large
in terms of their assets and debts, with a more complicated debt structure.
Thus, it needs additional study to understand the overall influence of corpo-
rate governance on the processes. 
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TABLE 9. REGRESSION ANALYSIS OF FACTORS ON DURATION OF THE PROCEEDINGS. 
variables model1 model2 model3 model4
β t β t β t β t
employee .269 1.510 .108 .844
capital -.084 -.466 -.045 -.356
sale -.855** -2.545 -.652** -2.757
profit -.192 -1.026 -.063 -.479
asset .877 1.656 .695* 1.870
debt .196 1.460 -.056 -.213
principal share .151 1.224 .062 .695
firm age when bankrupt .196 1.460 .636** 2.069
construction -.063 -.387 -.054 -.476
sales industry -.242 -1.753 -.165 -1.710
transport or info service -.028 -.219 -.058 -.645
reorganization .115 .968 .019 .209
founding period -.142 -1.668 .444 1.468
(decades)
bankruptcy year -.677*** -7.927 -.744*** -7.139
R2 .268 .013 .510 .668
(adjusted R2) (.116) (-.001) (.496) (.575)
N 64 71 71 64
Note: Total cases vary across models due to missing values of a few variables. I linearly interpolated
missing values with the values of the same variable in previous and next time points.
Model 3 deals with the effects of a firm’s resource and institutional envi-
ronments. The results indicate that both founding period and bankruptcy
year have a negative relationship with the duration: the later a firm was
found and the later it experienced bankruptcy, the more likely it is to com-
plete the proceedings quickly. Although it is not statistically significant, the
direction of the relationship suggests that more recently established firms
were able to normalize more quickly. I ran a T-test comparing those firms
found prior to 1970 and those after 1970 in terms of organizational charac-
teristics. In all dimensions such as capital, asset, debt, and employee, pre-
1970 firms, the first or second generation Chaebol subsidiaries, were larger
than their post-1970 counterparts. I argue that the size of the pre-1970 firms
and the effects of pre-1970s economic environments on firm organizations
tend to make the proceedings more complicated, which leads to a longer
duration. 
The timing of a bankruptcy shows a strong negative effect on the dura-
tion. Why does the timing present such a strong effect? The most obvious
answer is that the continuous revisions of bankruptcy legislation did man-
age to cut down the length of the proceedings for a firm to survive. There
was strong evidence that the longer a firm remained in the proceedings, the
more likely it would deplete all its resources, thus nullifying its chance of
survival. Therefore, it was one of the most important goals of the 1998, 1999,
and 2001 revisions to quicken the pace. The present analysis suggests that
the firms in a later period benefited from the revisions. It can be also argued
that the participants (e.g., judges, lawyers, custodians, creditors, and man-
agers) in the bankruptcy cases in subsequent periods learned from their pre-
decessors to improve the processes. From either changes in legislation or
learning, it is clear that the late-comers graduated earlier from the
processes.5 Model 4 puts together all the factors mentioned above. First, the
direction of the relationship of the variables that turn out to be statistically
significant in Model 4 do not change from previous models.6 In other
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5 An anonymous reviewer suggested that the effect of bankruptcy year can be interpreted as
either the effect of the number of corporate bankruptcies in each year or as that of legislative
reforms. In the former, the number of corporate bankruptcies suggests the effect of the pres-
sures on bankruptcy courts or of the social pressure to enhance bankruptcy procedures. I col-
lected the number of corporate bankruptcies for each year, but a regression analysis with this
variable does not produce statistically significant results. It is the latter, the effect of legislative
reforms, that I addressed in this paper. To highlight such factor or periodic effects, I ran a
regression analysis with each year as period dummy variables, with 1998 as a reference year.
The result showed that bankruptcy duration decreased gradually, thus suggesting that legal
changes did decrease bankruptcy duration.
6 In fact, only two variables, debt and founding period, do change the direction of their rela-
words, the effect of each variable is consistent regardless of other variables.
The statistically significant factors such as total sales and the timing of bank-
ruptcy in previous models still show significant effects. In fact, the effect of
the timing of bankruptcy increases in the final model. It turns out to be the
most crucial factor in explaining the duration. It suggests that the legal and,
more broadly, institutional environment of firms are crucial in explaining
the organizational processes of corporate bankruptcies, after controlling
organizational level characteristics. 
Finally, Model 4 shows that the older a firm was at the time of bankrupt-
cy, the longer it took to complete the processes. It has been argued that a
firm’s age indicates organizational legitimacy in institutional environments.
In the present case, however, the older a firm was at the time of bankruptcy,
the longer it took to survive. It can be argued that a positive effect of a firm’s
age is relatively weak in case of bankrupt firms whose legitimacy was
already damaged by bankruptcy itself. On the other hand, a firm’s age may
correspond with a more rigid organizational structure or a more complicat-
ed debt structure. These arguments require further analysis. 
DISCUSSION 
In the present paper, I examined the processes of corporate bankruptcy
proceedings of the listed companies on the Korea Stock Exchange. I collect-
ed a comprehensive list of the listed companies that went bankrupt since
1990. Additionally, I collected data on the courses and duration of their
bankruptcy proceedings along with their organizational and environmental
characteristics. 
The key research goals of the present paper consist of two things: first, to
compile a comprehensive set of corporate bankruptcy proceedings; and sec-
ond, to understand bankruptcy proceedings as organizational processes,
and not those pre-determined by technical criteria. Despite the growing
presence of corporate bankruptcies, including the Korean conglomerates at
this age of global competition, previous studies on corporate bankruptcies
neglected the processes after a firm filed for bankruptcy. 
The present study is a first step in viewing the processes after bankruptcy
as essentially organizational processes with a collective action problem: the
participants with conflicting interests (e.g., owners, employees, and credi-
tors) need to mobilize a coalition to prevent overall erosion of assets. Each
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tionship with the dependent variables in Model 4 compared with previous models.
However, they are not statistically significant in Model 4.
participant negotiates with others within a legal framework set by bank-
ruptcy legislation. As a first attempt at organizational analysis of bankrupt-
cy proceedings, I focused on the duration of the processes as the dependent
variable. I chose the duration since the field experts emphasized that it is
the key factor that can decide the overall outcome of the processes: a busi-
ness maintains its value only as a going concern, and to decrease its stay in
bankruptcy is crucial for increasing its chance of survival. Repeated revi-
sions of bankruptcy laws and their impact present a valuable opportunity
by which we can investigate how changes in institutional settings shape
strategic actions of organizational actors, and consequently change organi-
zational processes and their outcomes. 
The main findings of the present paper are as follows. First, the economic
crisis did increase the number of corporate bankruptcies, including a series
of large companies for the first time. Second, it is a crucial and strategic
decision for the participants to choose between composition and reorganiza-
tion, and the key aim of the legislative changes was to specify conditions for
each course. Third, the duration varies substantially across the firms that
survived. Finally, the more sales a firm produced at the time of bankruptcy,
and the later it filed for bankruptcy, the more quickly it survived back to a
normal business. On the other hand, the more assets it had, and the older it
was at the time of bankruptcy, the longer it took to complete the proceed-
ings. I argued that bankruptcy year indicates the effect of legislative envi-
ronments and potentially learning effects for the participants. Total sales
indicate, I argue, the attractiveness of a firm as a going concern, thus facili-
tating a quick consensus among those at stake. Firm assets and firm age
need additional data, but I asserted that assets and firm age may correspond
with more complicated debt structures, thus making a consensus harder
and protracting the processes. 
There are a couple of directions in the future study of corporate bankrupt-
cies. First, I will examine the rate of success and failure of corporate bank-
ruptcy cases with an event history analysis. Second, I will investigate the
factors that decide the selection of courses among composition, reorganiza-
tion, and liquidation using a multinomial analysis. Finally, for such projects,
I will collect the data on creditors in terms of their number, distribution, and
their organizational type, which will illuminate the complexity of debt
structures. These data will provide more insight into organizational process-
es of bankruptcy proceedings. 
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